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“In the Time of a Woman, Which Sex Was
Not Capable of Mature Deliberation”:
Late Tudor Parliamentary Relations and
Their Early Stuart Discontents
Josh Chafetz*

It is one of the most well-known incidents in English constitutional
history. On December 1, 1641, the increasingly restive House of
Commons presented Charles I with the so-called Grand Remonstrance, a
list of 206 enumerated grievances, encompassing the entirety of his reign
to date.1 The King was not amused. On January 3, 1642, he accused five
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* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This Article was originally prepared as part of
the lecture series in celebration of the centenary of the Elizabethan Club of Yale University, and I am
grateful to Justin Zaremby and Steve Parks for inviting me to deliver the lecture and to the audience at
the Yale Law School for helpful questions and comments. I am also grateful to Greg Alexander, Tom
McSweeney, Bernie Meyler, Aziz Rana, Josh Stein, and Catherine Roach for helpful and thoughtprovoking comments on earlier drafts. Arthur Kutoroff provided excellent research assistance. Any
remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own.
1. 1 JOHN RUSHWORTH, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS. THE THIRD PART; IN TWO VOLUMES.
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CONTAINING THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS WHICH HAPPENED FROM THE MEETING OF THE PARLIAMENT,
NOVEMBER THE 3D. 1640 TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1644, at 437-51 (London, Chiswell & Cockerill
1692) (reprinting the Grand Remonstrance).
2. 5 DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE INVASION OF JULIUS CAESAR TO THE
REVOLUTION IN 1688, at 364 (Liberty Fund 1983) (1778).
3. 2 H.C. JOUR. (1642) 366.
4. More precisely, they replied that “this House will take it into serious Consideration; and will
attend his Majesty with Answer, in all Humility and Duty, with as much Speed as the Greatness of the
Business will permit.” Id. at 367.
5. Id. at 368 (elision in original).
6. 1 RUSHWORTH, supra note 1, at 477.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 477-78.
9. Id. at 478.
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members of the House of Commons and Lord Kimbolton—all leaders of
the opposition to the Crown—of treason and sought to have them tried
before the House of Lords. Even David Hume, whose History of England
is generally charitable toward Charles, refers to this act as “[a]n
indiscretion, to which all the ensuing disorders and civil wars ought
immediately and directly to be ascribed.”2 The House of Commons
immediately passed a resolution authorizing armed resistance to Crown
officers attempting to arrest any member of Parliament.3 The King
demanded that the House of Commons turn over the accused members;
the Commons replied that they would think about it and get back to him.4
The House met the next day, with the five accused members in
attendance. The Commons Journal entry for that day ends abruptly with
the following notation:
His Majesty came into the House; and took Mr. Speaker’s Chair.
“Gentlemen,”
“I AM sorry to have this Occasion to come unto you[.”]
****
Resolved, upon the Question, That the House shall adjourn itself
till To-morrow One of Clock.5
One can only imagine the scene of chaos that must have overwhelmed the
poor Journals Clerk. Fortunately, his assistant, the indispensable John
Rushworth, provides the details in his Historical Collections. It seems
that, shortly after assembling for the day, the House learned that Charles
was marching on Westminster with a large guard.6 Hoping to avoid
violence, the House ordered the five accused members to leave; soon
thereafter, the King and his armed guard threw open the doors to the
chamber.7 Not seeing the accused members in attendance, he ascended to
the Speaker’s Chair and harangued the Commons.8 When he demanded
that the Speaker tell him where the members had gone, the Speaker
refused, insisting, “I Have neither Eyes to see, nor Tongue to speak in this
place, but as the House is pleased to direct me.”9
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As the King left the House in a huff, members were heard to yell,
“Priviledge! Priviledge!”10 And as the King walked the streets of London
the next day, commoners were heard to yell “Priviledges of Parliament!
Priviledges of Parliament!”11 Within a week, Charles left London—the
next time he would see it, he would be a prisoner. Several days later, the
House of Commons declared that anyone who arrested a member “by
Pretence or Colour of any Warrant issuing out from the King only, is
guilty of the Breach of the Liberties of the Subject, and of the Privilege of
Parliament, and a publick Enemy to the Commonwealth.”12 Charles soon
raised his standard at Nottingham; the Battle of Edgehill took place that
October.
This chain of events stands in rather marked contrast to previous great
constitutional conflagrations. Parliament’s origins lie in the practice of the
King’s taking “counsel with his great men” in order to “promote royal
ends and policies through cooperative discussion.”13 This group of royal
councilors was originally undifferentiated—although different advisors
might attend at different times, it was still essentially one body.14 Over
time, this group of “great men” expanded to include representatives of the
counties and the towns,15 and by the end of the thirteenth century,
Parliament had a clear institutional identity, distinct from other
mechanisms of royal governance (such as the council and the law
courts).16 As Parliament developed a more distinct and well-defined
institutional identity, it began to exercise more power.17 Still, there can be
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Id.
Id. at 479.
2 H.C. JOUR. (1642) 373.
J.R. MADDICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327, at 1 (2010); see also
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 22 (1999)
(“The acts of those parliaments were acts of the King, and their authority was his authority, fortified
by counsel and consent.”); A.F. POLLARD, THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT 34 (2d ed. 1926)
(“Parliament . . . seems to be at first simply a talk or parley of the [King’s] council in full session.”).
14. See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY
16-17 (1910) (noting the impossibility of “draw[ing] any definite line between Parliamentum, Curia,
concilium ordinarium, concilium privatum, magnum concilium, commune concilium”).
15. See MADDICOTT, supra note 13, at 198-204 (noting that, largely as a result of Magna Carta’s
requirement of consent to taxation, shire knights began to be more frequently summoned to
Parliaments beginning in the 1220s); id. at 204-05 (noting the thirteenth-century summoning of
burgesses to Parliament).
16. D.A. CARPENTER, THE REIGN OF HENRY III, at 382 (1996) (noting that the “first ‘official’ use
of the term parliament” occurs in 1236); see also id. at 381 (declaring “parliament in general and the
commons in particular” to be “creatures of the thirteenth century”); MADDICOTT, supra note 13, at 165
(“By 1258 parliament had gone some way towards becoming an institution.”). The same process of
role-differentiation can also be seen from the point of view of other institutions. See Thomas
McSweeney, English Judges and Roman Jurists: The Civilian Learning Behind England’s First Case
Law, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 832-33 (2012) (noting the efforts by the jurists and clerks of the royal
courts in the mid-thirteenth century to differentiate their functions and roles from those of other parts
of the royal administration).
17. See MADDICOTT, supra note 13, at 169 (noting the mid-thirteenth century emergence of
Parliament “as a political force”).
10.
11.
12.
13.
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18. A.F. POLLARD, PARLIAMENT IN THE WARS OF THE ROSES 7 (1936); see also Simon Payling,
The Later Middle Ages, in THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: SEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF BRITISH TRADITION
48, 55 (Robert Smith & John S. Moore eds., 1996) (noting that the “chief importance” of
parliamentary power over taxation lay in the fact that it gave the commons an opportunity to present
petitions and seek redress of grievances from the Crown).
19. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 13, at 22; see also id. at 29.
20. See CARPENTER, supra note 16, at 183-97.
21. See id. at 392-93.
22. MADDICOTT, supra note 13, at 308.
23. Id. at 337.
24. Id. at 359-60.
25. See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 13, at 31 (noting that, in the depositions of Edward II and
Richard II, “the responsible magnates ensured that the supposed assent of the three estates of the
realm . . . was formally recorded”).
26. See POLLARD, supra note 18, at 10-11.
27. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 13, at 32.
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no doubt that it served primarily as an engine of royal government. As
Pollard describes Parliaments under Edward I, “He wanted money and
they wanted redress of grievances; but their petitions were local or
personal, and the initiative in public legislation still lay with the King and
his ministers who alone possessed the knowledge, outlook, and
circumspection essential to the comprehension of national problems.”18
Or, in Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s words, “[t]he acts of those parliaments were
acts of the King, and their authority was his authority, fortified by counsel
and consent.”19
On those few occasions—radical caesurae in English constitutional
history—on which royal government broke down, it was the higher
nobility, not the knights and burgesses, who stepped forward. The 1258
rebellion against Henry III was led by the baronial class;20 only afterwards
did Simon de Montfort (himself an earl) summon representatives of the
shires to discuss the state of the kingdom. 21 Likewise, as Maddicott notes,
opposition to Edward I’s expensive foreign adventuring “was headed by
the magnates, naturally enough.”22 And when opposition to his son,
Edward II, began to build, it was the lords who took the lead in exiling his
favorites, using the commoners simply as political cover against the
charge of a baronial coup.23 Again, in 1327, “as was only to be expected,
the initiators of Edward’s deposition were not the commons but the lords,”
who once more looked to the knights and burgesses simply to provide
political cover,24 a pattern that repeated yet again when Richard II was
deposed in favor of Henry IV in 1399.25 Similarly, the Parliaments
summoned during the Wars of the Roses were little more than tools used
by whomever summoned them to attaint the rival claimant and announce
their patron’s right to the throne.26 It is true enough that Henry Tudor
summoned a Parliament in 1485 to pass an Act of Succession, ratifying his
right to rule as Henry VII,27 but we should be careful not to be overly
legalistic about it. Henry VII was King when Richard’s crown was placed
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on his head at Bosworth;28 parliamentary assent was an afterthought.
Writing in the midst of the Wars of the Roses, Sir John Fortescue
referred to the English Crown as exercising dominium politicum et
regale—political and royal lordship.29 This was meant to differentiate it
from the French Crown, which exercised simple dominium regale—royal
lordship.30 The former required consent to taxation, whereas the latter did
not.31 The Monarch’s position in England was not quite the Monarch’s
position in France; Parliament was an essential cog in the governance of
the English realm. But it was still first and foremost the Monarch’s realm.
The King’s lordship may be political as well as royal, but lordship it
remained.32 Parliament was still distinctly secondary; its job was to
“advise and assist [the King] in transacting the affairs of the realm.”33 As
Simon Payling has noted, “The late medieval House of Commons
certainly did not see itself as engaged in a struggle with the Crown for
sovereignty, or even for a share in the formulation and execution of
policy.”34
The question, then, is what happens between 1485 and 1642? That is,
how do we get from a world in which a civil war is fought amongst the
baronial class and the Commons is used simply as a tool to confirm the
fait accompli of Tudor victory to a world in which the Commons leads the
revolt against the Stuart Crown? I should be clear here about the nature of
my inquiry: I am not asking about the “causes” of the English Civil War.
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28. Although there is debate among historians as to where precisely on the battlefield Richard’s
circlet was found, there seems to be general acceptance that it was, in fact, found at Bosworth Field
and placed on Henry’s head after the battle. Compare S.B. CHRIMES, HENRY VII 49 n.1 (1999)
(arguing that the circlet was found “amidst the spoils of the battle” but not, as later mythology had it,
in a hawthorn bush), with CHARLES ROSS, RICHARD III 225 n.52 (1981) (arguing that the hawthorn
bush would not have become so central to Tudor iconography were the story not true). Shakespeare, of
course, does not tell us where the crown was found, but shows us Lord Stanley crowning Henry with
it: “Lo, here this long-usurpèd royalty / From the dead temples of this bloody wretch / Have I plucked
off, to grace thy brows withal. / Wear it, enjoy it, and make much of it.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
RICHARD III act 5, sc. 5, ll. 4-7 (Yale Univ. Press ann. ed. 2008). Henry’s right to rule is thus figured
as a consequence of the brute fact of military victory, not of the Act of Succession.
29. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND: OTHERWISE CALLED THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ABSOLUTE AND A LIMITED MONARCHY 109-16 (Charles Plummer ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 1885) (c. 1471) [hereinafter FORTESCUE ORIGINAL]. For a modern
translation of the text, see SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, The Governance of England, in ON THE LAWS AND
GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 81, 83-90 (Shelley Lockwood ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (c. 1471)
[hereinafter FORTESCUE TRANSLATED].
30. FORTESCUE ORIGINAL, supra note 29, at 113; FORTESCUE TRANSLATED, supra note 29, at 87.
31. FORTESCUE ORIGINAL, supra note 29, at 109; FORTESCUE TRANSLATED, supra note 29, at 83.
32. As Alan Cromartie has persuasively argued, the value of consent for Fortescue was not
inherent—that is, not because of some theory of representation—but rather as “a sign that kings had
taken appropriate counsel.” ALAN CROMARTIE, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY ON
THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1450-1642, at 24 (2006). See also id. at 27-28, 30 (further elaborating on
Fortescue’s understanding of the role of consent). Parliamentary consent was thus a device that
allowed the monarch to make better decisions for his kingdom, not a device for sharing sovereign
power.
33. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 13, at 32.
34. Payling, supra note 18, at 48.
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A voluminous literature on that topic already exists, pointing to political,35
religious,36 economic,37 social,38 and cultural39 factors that led to the
revolt, and this Article has no new causal candidates to put forward.40
Rather, it is focused on the following institutional question, a question that
has not received nearly as much attention: What allowed the House of
Commons to serve as the locus of discontent? How were the members of
the House of Commons able to develop the esprit de corps, the
constitutional self-confidence, and the justificatory language that enabled
them to take the lead in a war against Charles I?41
My argument here is that, to answer this question, we must attend
carefully to developments in matters of institutional procedure, beginning
roughly in the middle of Henry VIII’s reign. These developments might
individually seem minor and purely internal to Parliament, which may
well explain why they have been largely overlooked by scholars, who
have seen the late Tudor period as one of monarchical domination of
Parliament. But this Article contends that, in the aggregate, these
procedural developments allowed the House of Commons to begin to
understand itself as a key constitutional actor in its own right—that is,
they allowed it to begin to see itself as an essential element in the
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35. See, e.g., CROMARTIE, supra note 32, at 3 (“This book sets out to recreate the intellectual
world in which the aspirations of the godly fitted into a political solution to the crisis of the Stuart
monarchy.”); Noah Millstone, Evil Counsel: The Propositions to Bridle the Impertinency of
Parliament and the Critique of Caroline Government in the Late 1620s, 50 J. BRIT. STUD. 813, 815
(2011) (“[P]roblems of constitutional change and tyranny formed a critical part of early Stuart political
life; in other words, they were native categories.”); see also William H. Dray, J.H. Hexter, NeoWhiggism and Early Stuart Historiography, 26 HIST. & THEORY 133, 139-43 (1987) (discussing
historian J.H. Hexter’s political account of the Civil War).
36. See, e.g., JOHN MORRILL, THE NATURE OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 68 (1993) (“The
English civil war was not the first European revolution: it was the last of the Wars of Religion.”); S.K.
Baskerville, Puritans, Revisionists, and the English Revolution, 61 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 151, 153
(1998) (“Only by confronting the content of religious zeal squarely can we begin to see the radicalism
of the English Revolution and of Puritanism within it.”).
37. See, e.g., Christopher Hill, A Bourgeois Revolution?, in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641,
1688, 1776, at 109, 111 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980) (arguing that the English Civil War was “made
possible by the fact that there had already been a considerable development of capitalist relations in
England”); Christopher Hill, Introduction to THE GOOD OLD CAUSE: THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF
1640-1660, at 19, 20-31 (Christopher Hill & Edmund Dell eds., 2d ed. 1969) (summarizing the
economic causes of the Civil War).
38. See, e.g., H.R. TREVOR-ROPER, THE GENTRY 1540-1640, at 26-53 (1960) (describing the Civil
War in terms of the Court-Country divide); Conrad Russell, Why Did Charles I Fight the Civil War?,
HIST. TODAY, June 1984, at 31, 32-33 (describing the Civil War as a baronial rebellion akin to earlier
instances of the magnates rising against the crown).
39. See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, “Our Cities Institutions” and the Institution of the Common
Law, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 441, 442 (2010) (suggesting that Jacobean drama played a role in
“deliberat[ions] about legal and political arguments”).
40. Conrad Russell, whose groundbreaking study set out to match specific Civil War “effects” to
a myriad of causes, began by noting that “we [historians] have certainly spilt enough ink on the causes
of the English Civil War.” CONRAD RUSSELL, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 1 (1990).
41. Because this Article focuses on events culminating in 1642, I do not here discuss the later
power struggle between the House of Commons and Cromwell’s New Model Army, leading in 1648
to Pride’s Purge and the Rump Parliament.
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governance of the realm, rather than as an element of royal governance.
When the first two Stuart monarchs attempted to roll back the gains that
the House had made in these areas under Henry VIII and Elizabeth, the
House fought back, all the while continuing to hone its sense of its
constitutional place.42 The issues of institutional procedure discussed in
this Article fall under the general heading of parliamentary privilege.43
The best-known privilege of Parliament is freedom of speech and
debate—and it is not coincidental that the practice of demanding this
privilege in the Speaker’s petition to the Crown at the beginning of a new
parliamentary session dates to the reign of Henry VIII (1541, to be
precise).44 In this Article, however, I intend to focus on two lesser-studied
elements of parliamentary privilege in this period: the House’s power over
its own composition and its power to hold outsiders in contempt of
Parliament.
Part I traces the transformation of these powers from tools of royalist
government to tools of Parliament in its own right. This transformation
took place during the late Tudor period—that is, roughly the period from
the last decade of Henry VIII’s reign through the end of Elizabeth’s. Part
II traces the early Stuart reaction against and dismissal of these late Tudor
precedents, including James I’s dismissal of an Elizabethan precedent with
the line that gave this Article its title.45 But the institutional selfconfidence that it had gained in the course of winning its privileges from
Henry VIII and Elizabeth allowed the House of Commons to push back
with increasing fortitude against James’s and Charles’s attempts at

07/10/2013 12:28:45
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42. In writing this, I am well aware of recent controversies over the extent to which most
members of the House were concerned with local affairs, to the exclusion of great matters of state.
Compare Glenn Burgess, On Revisionism: An Analysis of Early Stuart Historiography in the 1970s
and 1980s, 33 HIST. J. 609, 619-20 (1990) (noting that “local studies” of mid-seventeenth century
England have shown that “[t]he ‘political nation’ (divided into Royalists and Parliamentarians)
[consisted of] two tiny groups of zealots struggling to overcome the apathy and indifference of
everyone else . . . . For many of the English gentry the major aim in the 1640s was to preserve the
local community, their country, from disruption . . . .”), with CROMARTIE, supra note 32, at 219-20
(arguing that revisionist scholarship has both overstated the provincialism of members of Parliament
of the era and erroneously treated provincialism as apolitical), and LAWRENCE STONE, THE CAUSES OF
THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1529-1642, at 168-69 (rev. ed. 2002) (arguing both that local leaders had
numerous attachments with the government at London and that local elites were deeply concerned
with national politics). But even if we take the revisionist claims at face value and read the grand
actions in the House of Commons as reflecting only the interests of a dedicated few who made such
issues their own, it is still no less important to ask why and how they were able to situate this
opposition in the House. And how did their arguments for authority in the House come to be so
compelling that people on the street in London chastised the King for his infringement on
parliamentary privilege? See supra text accompanying note 11. These are the questions that I seek to
answer here.
43. On parliamentary privilege generally, see JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW:
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
(2007); and CARL WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (1921).
44. See CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 70; F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 242 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963).
45. See infra text accompanying note 97.

33760-ylh_25-2 Sheet No. 7 Side B

07/10/2013 12:28:45

CHAFETZ

188

7/5/2013 12:38 PM

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities

[Vol. 25:181

retrenchment. The Conclusion completes the circle, returning to Charles
I’s flight from London, and points toward the lasting consequences of this
chain of events.
I. THE LATE TUDORS
A. Composition of the House
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46. See G.R. ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 253 (1960)
(noting, of parliamentary privilege generally, that it was “intended to enable an institution which the
king required for his purposes to do the work which he demanded from it”).
47. JOHN GLANVILLE, REPORTS OF CERTAIN CASES, DETERMINED AND ADJUDGED BY THE
COMMONS IN PARLIAMENT, IN THE TWENTY-FIRST AND TWENTY-SECOND YEARS OF THE REIGN OF
KING JAMES THE FIRST, at xi-xii (London, Baker & Leigh 1775). I thank Tom McSweeney for help
with the translation.
48. Id. at xvi-xvii. I again thank Tom McSweeney for help with the translation.
49. Id. at xx-xxi.
50. See Betty Kemp, The Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds, in ESSAYS PRESENTED TO SIR
LEWIS NAMIER 204, 205 (Richard Pares & A.J.P. Taylor eds., 1956); Josh Chafetz, Leaving the
House: The Constitutional Status of Resignation from the House of Representatives, 58 DUKE L.J. 177,
185 (2008).
51. 3 S.T. BINDOFF, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1509-1558, at 2829 (1982).
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When Parliament’s role was merely to assist the King in governing his
realm, it made sense that any questions about Parliament’s composition
would be settled by the King, either personally or via his designated
agents.46 And that is precisely what we see in early disputes over
parliamentary elections. Thus, in 1319, Mathew de Cranthorn petitioned
the King’s Council, claiming that he had been elected a knight of the shire
for the county of Devon, but had been deprived of his seat by a false return
by the sheriff. The Council referred the petition to the Court of
Exchequer—that is, to the King’s justice—for adjudication.47 In 1384,
Thomas Camoyes, a minor noble, was returned a knight of the shire for
Surrey. Being a peer of the realm, he was ineligible, and his election was
accordingly voided by Richard II and his Council, which then issued a
writ for the election of a new knight of the shire.48 And in 1413, Henry IV
actually turned a disputed Commons election over to the “discretions” of
the Lords.49 Nor was royal control over parliamentary composition limited
to entering the House; those seeking to leave parliamentary service had to
seek royal permission, which was not infrequently denied.50
But this state of affairs began to change in the mid-sixteenth century. In
1553, during Mary’s reign, the House of Commons took an active role in
determining an election result for the first time. Alexander Nowell was
returned as the member for the borough of West Looe in Cornwall, but his
election was challenged on the grounds that he was a church official and
therefore ineligible.51 A committee, appointed by the House to investigate,
reported back that he was, indeed, ineligible; the House accepted the
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Id.
Id.
1 H.C. JOUR. (1581) 117.
Id.
SIMONDS D’EWES, THE JOURNALS OF ALL THE PARLIAMENTS DURING THE REIGN OF QUEEN
ELIZABETH 281-82 (Paul Bowes ed., London, Starkey 1682).
57. Id. at 307-08.
58. Id. at 308.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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Committee’s report; and the Speaker asked the Queen to issue a writ for a
new election.52 Whether or not she in fact ordered a new election has been
lost to history,53 but the Commons were just getting started. It was during
Elizabeth’s reign that the jurisdictional clash over election disputes really
came to the fore.
Elizabeth’s fourth Parliament, elected in 1572, did not meet between
1576 and 1581. In those years, naturally, some members had died, become
seriously ill, or gone abroad in the Queen’s service. In preparation for the
1581 session, the Lord Chancellor accordingly issued writs of election to
choose replacements. When the House convened, however, it was moved
that “divers Persons being newly returned in the Places of others, yet
living, were not, or ought to be accounted, Members of this House.”54 In
other words, the motion disputed the right of the Crown to declare vacant
the seats of those elected members who were still alive. The newly
returned claimants were asked to step aside while their membership was
debated.55 Supporters of their right to sit argued that “it sufficeth to make
suggestion in the Chancery, and to procure a Writ thereupon for a new
Election. And to question this was to discredit the Lord Chancellor and to
scandalize the Judicial Proceedings of that Court.”56 Here, then, we have a
jurisdictional clash. Those who wanted to debate the claimants’ right to sit
thought, relying on the Nowell precedent, that such things were
examinable in the House. Those who disagreed thought that the mere fact
of an election writ issued out from Chancery was sufficient—that is, they
thought that, once royal officials had made clear how they wished the
matter to be settled, the House should fall meekly in line. It was the
partisans of the House’s own power who carried the day: after receiving a
committee report, the House readmitted those members who were still
living and voided the election of their replacements.57 The House also
issued a strong rebuke to the Lord Chancellor, resolving that, “during the
time of sitting of this Court, there do not at any time any Writ go out for
the chusing or returning of any Knight, Citizen, Burgess, or Baron without
the Warrant of this House first directed for the same to the Clerk of the
Crown . . . .”58 The Commons thus asserted that they had the exclusive
right to judge in matters of their own composition.
This right was put to the test a mere five years later. In the 1586
elections to Elizabeth’s sixth Parliament, the county of Norfolk returned
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59. GLANVILLE, supra note 47, at xlii-xliii.
60. D’EWES, supra note 56, at 393.
61. Id. at 396.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 397.
66. See 2 P.W. HASLER, THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 1558-1603, at
106-07 (1981).
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Thomas Farmer and William Gresham as shire knights. This election was
protested in Chancery, and another election writ was issued. This time,
Gresham and Christopher Heydon were returned. When the House
convened, it opened an inquiry into the Norfolk election.59 Elizabeth,
however, wanted to reassert her authority—via the Lord Chancellor—to
resolve disputed elections, and she had the Lord Chancellor inform the
House that it was “in truth impertinent” for it to consider electoral
disputes, which “only belong[] to the Charge and Office of the Lord
Chancellor, from whence the Writs for the same Elections issued out, and
are thither returnable again.”60 The House promptly ignored this rebuke
and appointed a committee to examine the Norfolk returns;61 this
committee concluded that the first election was conducted properly.62
Apparently, the Lord Chancellor, after consulting with some of the judges,
had come to the same conclusion;63 the committee wanted it known,
however, that it was its conclusion that counted. Accordingly, it resolved
that it was
prejudicial to the priviledge of the House to have the same
determined by others than such as were Members thereof. And
though they thought very reverently of the said Lord Chancellor
and Judges, and thought them competent Judges in their places; yet
in this case they took them not for Judges in Parliament in this
House.64
The committee thus quite literally sought to put royal officials “in their
places.” The House accepted the committee’s report and passed its own
resolution stating
[t]hat it was a most perilous Precedent, that after two Knights of a
County were duly Elected, any new Writ should issue out for a
second Election without order of the House of Commons it
self . . . .
That the discussing and adjudging of this and such like differences,
only belonged to the said House . . . .
That though the Lord Chancellor and Judges were competent
Judges in their proper Courts, yet they were not in Parliament.65
Elizabeth yielded, and Thomas Farmer took his seat.66 By the end of the
sixteenth century, then, admission to the House of Commons had passed
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from being a matter of royal judgment to a matter of parliamentary
judgment.67 Or, put differently, the Crown was no longer the legal
gatekeeper to the House of Commons.68
And, of course, gates tend to swing both ways, so it is unsurprising that
the House was simultaneously asserting exclusive jurisdiction over the
resignations of its members. No longer did members who wished to leave
Parliament seek the permission of the Crown to do so; rather, beginning
with Elizabeth’s long parliament (1572-1583), they had to seek the
permission of the House itself.69 This, of course, makes perfect sense if the
House now understood its members to be servants of the House, rather
than servants of the Crown.70
B. Contempt of Parliament and Breach of Privilege
At almost exactly the same time, this same understanding of the House
of Commons as a body with a distinct and powerful constitutional identity
began to assert itself in contempt of Parliament proceedings as well. The
story here has a similar outline to the elections story.71 At first, because
Parliament was an instrument of royal governance, contempt of
Parliament was an offense against the Crown. Thus, in 1404, when John
Sallage “emblemished and maimed even to the peril of death” the servant
of a member of Parliament, Henry IV ordered Sallage to appear before the
King’s Bench, where he was ordered to pay double damages, plus a fine
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67. Andrew Thrush suggests that the House “beat a hasty retreat” from its stand in the Norfolk
election controversy when, in 1589, a committee resolved that “this House is to take notice of all
Returns only in such sort as the same shall be certified unto this House by the Clerk of the Crown in
the Chancery and not otherwise.” D’EWES, supra note 56, at 430; see also Andrew Thrush, Commons
v. Chancery: The 1604 Buckinghamshire Election Dispute Revisited, 26 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 301,
302 (2007). But Thrush stopped reading too quickly, for the committee immediately went on to void
the election for the borough of Appleby and to recommend the granting of a new election writ, an
opinion that was “well liked of by this House.” D’EWES, supra note 56, at 430. See also id. at 441
(seating a member for the Port of New Rumney despite the fact that the Clerk of the Crown had not
yet certified his election). And in the midst of a 1601 election dispute, when it was inquired whether, if
the returned member were not seated, a new election warrant should issue out from the Speaker of the
House or from the Clerk of the Crown, “it was agreed per omnes, that from the Speaker.” Id. at 624;
see also Thrush, supra, at 303-04 (describing this incident). The House’s practice post-1586 thus
seems fully consistent with its resolution of the Norfolk election.
68. J.E. Neale succinctly summarized the stakes of this transition: “There can be no doubt as to
where, by [prior] constitutional theory, jurisdiction lay. It lay with the Crown in Chancery. Equally
there can be no doubt about the practical issue involved. If the Crown—through Council or Chancery,
or both—could quash elections displeasing to itself and order new ones, then, when hard-driven and
unscrupulous, it could take steps to exclude troublesome critics from Parliament.” 2 J.E. NEALE,
ELIZABETH I AND HER PARLIAMENTS, 1584-1601, at 184 (1957). See also RUSSELL, supra note 40, at
41 (noting fears of royal “power to control the Parliament by controlling its membership”).
69. See Kemp, supra note 50, at 205; see also sources cited in id. at 205 nn.2-4.
70. Elton and Neale thus view the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over disputed elections as
evidence of the House’s political maturation. See ELTON, supra note 46, at 254; 2 NEALE, supra note
68, at 185.
71. For more extended discussions of contempt of Parliament, see CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at
193-206; and Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1093119 (2009).
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72. HENRY ELSYNGE, THE MANNER OF HOLDING PARLIAMENTS IN ENGLAND 189-91 (London,
Richardson & Clark 1768).
73. 11 Hen. 6, c. 11 (1433).
74. Id.
75. 1 JOHN HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS; WITH
OBSERVATIONS 53 (London, Hughs 2d ed. 1785).
76. Id. at 53-54.
77. Id. at 54-55.
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and ransom to the Crown.72 And in 1433, a statute made double damages,
fine, and ransom the punishments for all cases of assault upon a member
of Parliament.73 Indeed, it is worth noting the enacting language of this
statute: “The King willing to provide for the Ease and Tranquility of them
that come to the Parliaments and Councils of the King by his
Commandment, hath ordained and stablished . . . .”74 As long as the
Crown was the motive force in the political state—as long as the King
“ordained and stablished” laws—it made perfect sense to consider
contempts against Parliament (that is, against his advisory body) as
contempts against himself. Thus, the statute treats parliaments identically
to councils: both are mechanisms by which subjects participate in royal
governance. And the penalties for assaulting parliamentarians and
councillors were not only meted out by royal justice; they also included
fines and ransoms payable to the Crown.
But, as with jurisdiction over disputed elections, the location of the
contempt power began to change in the mid-sixteenth century. The
defining moment came with the arrest of George Ferrers in 1542. Ferrers
was a member of Parliament from Plymouth when he was arrested in
London pursuant to an action in the King’s Bench to recover a debt (for
which Ferrers served as a surety).75 Upon being notified of his arrest, the
House of Commons sent its sergeant to demand his release; the jailers,
however, refused to turn him over. A physical confrontation ensued, and
the sergeant was forced to flee back to the House.76 The Lord Chancellor,
a Crown official, offered to arm the sergeant with a royal writ for Ferrers’s
release, but, in a remarkable move, the House of Commons declined his
assistance, declaring that “all commandments and other acts proceeding
from the [House of Commons], were to be done and executed by their
Serjeant without writ, only by shew of his mace, which was his warrant.”77
In other words, they did not want him released because the Crown said so;
they wanted him released because they said so.
By this point, word had gotten out that the House of Commons was on
the warpath, and the jailers holding Ferrers decided to surrender him
without a fight when the sergeant returned. But securing Ferrers’s release
was not enough; the House also committed to prison the sheriffs and
jailers who had held Ferrers and the person upon whose suit Ferrers had
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Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 55. On the Little Ease, see L.A. PARRY, THE HISTORY OF TORTURE IN ENGLAND 80
1 HATSELL, supra note 75, at 55-56.
See 2 BINDOFF, supra note 51, at 130.
1 HATSELL, supra note 75, at 56-57.
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78.
79.
(1975).
80.
81.
82.
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been arrested.78 Special pains were reserved for the jailer who had started
the physical confrontation with the sergeant—he was committed to the
Little Ease dungeon of the Tower of London, a cell so small that the
prisoner could not fully stretch out in any direction.79 The House’s
prisoners were only released after the Mayor of London and other
powerful friends made “humble suit” to the House on their behalf.80
But the matter was not quite finished, for, in addition to being a member
of Parliament, Ferrers was in the King’s service.81 After the Commons had
resolved the matter, freeing Ferrers on its own authority and imprisoning
those who had arrested him, Henry called prominent members of the
House before him:
First commending their wisdome in maintaining the Privileges of
the House (which he would not have to be infringed in any point)
alledged that he, being head of the Parliament, and attending in his
own person upon the business thereof, ought in reason to have
Privilege for him, and all his servants attending there upon him. So
that if the said Ferrers had been no Burgess, but only his servant,
that in respect thereof he was to have the Privilege, as well as any
other. For I understand, quoth he, that you, not only for your own
persons, but also for your necessary servants, even to your cooks
and horse-keepers, enjoy the said Privilege . . . . And further, we be
informed by our Judges; that we at no time stand so highly in our
Estate Royal, as in the time of Parliament; wherein we as Head,
and you as Members, are conjoin’d and knit together into one
Body Politick, so as whatsoever offence or injury (during that
time) is offered to the meanest Member of the House, is to be
judg’d as done against our Person and the whole Court of
Parliament; which prerogative of the Court is so great (as our
learned Counsel informeth us) as all acts and processes coming out
of any other inferior Courts, must for the time cease and give place
to the highest.82
Beneath the superficial pleasantries here lies a serious struggle over
Parliament’s role in the constitutional order. The King is attempting to
reassert the House’s role as his advisory body. His claim that his servants
should be afforded privilege is a claim that privilege is meant to help the
House serve him. Just as the House of Commons’s rejection of the Lord
Chancellor’s proffered writ constituted a statement about the role of the
House in the English Constitution, the King’s speech constituted his
rejoinder. The House asserted that it could act by itself, for itself. The
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83. Cromartie, in discussing this passage, has likewise observed that Henry’s remarks were “less a
claim that kingship was parliamentary than that the houses of parliament were royal.” CROMARTIE,
supra note 32, at 79. But Cromartie discusses only Henry’s speech to the members of the House,
completely ignoring the back-and-forth between crown officials and members of the House. He
therefore misses the extent to which this episode marked a rising assertiveness on the House’s part—
an assertiveness against which Henry was pushing.
84. See Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1098-100.
85. MAITLAND, supra note 44, at 242; see also CROMARTIE, supra note 32, at 92, 98 (suggesting
that English government under Mary and Elizabeth can accurately be characterized as absolutist);
STONE, supra note 42, at 59 (“After many years in which it has not been respectable to use the phrase
in academic circles, the concept of ‘Tudor despotism’, as an aspiration if not a reality, is at last
becoming something that can be talked about again.”).
86. Wallace Notestein famously located the House’s “winning of the initiative” in the reign of
James I, and described Elizabeth as having “the whip hand” over the House of Commons. WALLACE
NOTESTEIN, THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE BY THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 13 (photo reprint 1971)
(1926). Notestein’s focus was on legislation, and he accordingly noted that parliamentary upstarts like
Strickland and Wentworth were unable to overcome the power of the Crown, as exercised via Privy
Councillors in the House, in matters such as religion, succession, etc. But Notestein overlooked the
ways in which Parliament’s struggles with Henry and Elizabeth over its privileges laid the groundwork
for its struggles with James and Charles over affairs of state.
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King insisted that the House’s actions were necessarily in his service.83
But Henry’s words notwithstanding, it was the House’s deeds that set
the tone for the future. Henceforth, it would be the House, and the House
alone, that would punish contempt of Parliament and breach of
parliamentary privilege. In doing so, the House would assert an
institutional identity distinct from the Crown. Contempts were no longer
interferences with the functioning of royal governance; instead, they were
interferences with the House’s ability to do its own business. And this shift
had an important corollary: it now became possible to conceive of
contempts committed by Crown officials, or even by Monarchs
themselves. After all, when Parliament was just one instrument of royal
governance, a dispute between it and some other instrument of royal
governance could be settled by reference to a supervening authority: the
will of the King. But once Parliament stood outside of royal governance,
there was no supervening power, and Crown officials, like everyone else,
could run afoul of the contempt power. Thus, for example, throughout the
1560s and 1570s, we see a repeating pattern in which the House irks the
Queen (usually by poking its nose into issues of succession and/or
religion); Elizabeth responds by ordering them to cease their discussions
or by detaining a member; the House howls that the Queen has breached
its privileges; and the Queen backs down.84 The language of contempt and
breach of privilege was powerful, even against the Monarch herself.
We thus have a moment in the mid-sixteenth century—a time when
many historians have viewed the House of Commons as “very
submissive,” in Maitland’s words85—in which we can see the House
carving out for itself a distinct institutional identity. It is, of course, true
that the initiative on great matters of state remained with the Crown
throughout the Tudor period.86 But beneath the surface, in these disputes
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over parliamentary privilege, the House began to carve out essential space
in which it controlled admission and in which it kept order.
And then the Stuarts came.
II. THE EARLY STUARTS
A. Composition of the House
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87. GODFREY DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS, 1603-1660, at 2 (1952); see also Thrush, supra note
67, at 304-06 (describing how Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s maneuverings were designed to create a
clash between Chancery and the Commons).
88. On the Goodwin-Fortescue controversy generally, see CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 147-48.
89. GEORGE PETYT, LEX PARLIAMENTARIA: OR, A TREASTISE OF THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE
PARLIAMENTS OF ENGLAND 299-301 (London, Goodwin 1690).
90. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1604) 151-52; see also PETYT, supra note 89, at 302-04 (laying out the House’s
reasons).
91. See WITTKE, supra note 43, at 58-59; see also CONRAD RUSSELL, KING JAMES VI AND I AND
HIS ENGLISH PARLIAMENTS 28 (Richard Cust & Andrew Thrush eds., 2011) (noting the unusual
“depth of involvement of an inexperienced king” in the Goodwin-Fortescue controversy).
92. PETYT, supra note 89, at 304-05.
93. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1604) 156.
94. PETYT, supra note 89, at 306-07.
95. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1604) 158.
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In his very first parliamentary summons, in 1604, James I directed that
election returns should be made in Chancery, which would judge any
election or qualification disputes.87 In Buckinghamshire, Sir Francis
Goodwin had defeated Sir John Fortescue;88 Goodwin, however, had been
outlawed for personal debt, and the Crown thus directed that a new writ
should issue, as James’s summons had forbidden the election of outlaws.89
The House of Commons, determining that outlawry in personal actions did
not create a disqualification to serve in Parliament, resolved that Goodwin
was the rightfully elected member from Buckinghamshire and proceeded
to seat him.90 Fortescue, it should be noted, was a Privy Councillor, and
James seems to have taken a personal interest in his career.91 The King
was therefore naturally unsatisfied with the Commons’ determination, and
he asked the Lords to look into the matter. The Lords resolved that
Goodwin was disqualified and that the seat should have gone to Fortescue,
and they sought a conference with the Commons to explain their reasons.92
The Commons declined, on the grounds that “it did not stand with the
Honour and Order of the House, to give Account of any of their
Proceedings or Doings” to the Lords.93
The Commons then sought a meeting with James himself, and the King
granted the Speaker an audience.94 James insisted that “he had no Purpose
to impeach [the House’s] Privilege: But since they derived all Matters of
Privilege from him, and by his Grant, he expected they should not be
turned against him.”95 In other words, he was attempting the same gambit
that Henry VIII tried in Ferrers’s case—he was asserting that privilege
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existed to help Parliament serve the Crown, not to allow Parliament to
resist the Crown. And what of the Elizabethan precedent, from the case of
the Norfolk election? After all, that case seemed clearly to stand for the
proposition that the House, and not the Crown, had the final word on
parliamentary composition.96 It did not bind, James asserted, because it
occurred “in the Time of a Woman, which Sex was not capable of Mature
Deliberation.”97 Using Elizabeth’s gender as a convenient excuse,98 James
was seeking to roll back the gains the House had made in the previous
century.
The House would not yield, with one member insisting that the issue
had now “become the Case of the whole kingdom” because, if Chancery
were to win, “the free election of the country is taken away, and none shall
be chosen but such as shall please the king and council.”99 The House
drew up a petition setting out its reasons for accepting Goodwin as the
rightfully returned member, as well as asserting its exclusive jurisdiction
over election returns.100 Finally, James proposed a compromise: neither
Goodwin nor Fortescue would have the seat; instead, there would be yet
another election for the Buckinghamshire seat.101 Moreover, at the King’s
suggestion, the House quietly admitted both Goodwin and Fortescue for
other seats.102 But the House wanted to ensure that its acceptance of the
compromise could not be construed as acquiescence on the jurisdictional
point; it therefore appointed a committee, which drew up a document titled
The Form of an Apology or Satisfaction of the House of Commons
Concerning Their Privileges. The Apology reiterated the House’s claim
that “the House of Commons is the sole proper Judge of the Return of all
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96. Derek Hirst has insisted that the Elizabethan precedents “left the central issue of ultimate
jurisdiction undecided” and therefore that “there was still no universally accepted precedent to guide
the parties” in the Goodwin-Fortescue controversy. Derek Hirst, Elections and the Privileges of the
House of Commons in the Early Seventeenth Century: Confrontation or Compromise?, 18 HIST. J.
851, 852 (1975). But this conclusion seems unsupported, not only by the results of the 1581
controversy, see supra text accompanying notes 54-58, but also by the stridency of the House’s
language—language that went unrebutted by the Crown—in the case of the Norfolk election, see
supra text accompanying notes 59-68. Moreover, the fact that James resorted to an ad feminam
argument against the Monarch who acceded to parliamentary jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying
note 97, suggests that he, at least, thought that the outcome of the Elizabethan cases was clear—and
clearly bad. Contra Hirst, then, the best interpretation is not that the 1581 and 1586 precedents were
ambiguous, but rather that James was attempting to overturn those precedents and return to an earlier
understanding of the relationship between Crown and Parliament.
97. PETYT, supra note 89, at 309.
98. This certainly does not make James unique. As Natalie Mears has persuasively argued,
gendered attacks on Elizabeth, even during her life, were most often used, not as attacks on female
monarchy as such, but rather as a convenient language for opposition rooted in other factors. See
NATALIE MEARS, QUEENSHIP AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE ELIZABETHAN REALMS 222-29
(2005).
99. 1 WILLIAM COBBETT, THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 1003 (London, Hansard 1806).
100. 1 H.C. JOUR. (1604) 162-65.
101. Id. at 168, 171.
102. See Hirst, supra note 96, at 853.
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such Writs, and of the Election of all such Members as belong unto it.”103
Moreover, the Apology insisted, Chancery’s role was limited to sending
out the writs of election, receiving the returns, and preserving them for the
House, “yet the same is done only for the Use of the Parliament.”104 This
is the mirror image of Henry’s and James’s claims that Parliament exists
to serve the Crown; here, the House is insisting that Crown officers exist
to serve the House of Commons. As Derek Hirst has noted, the most
salient feature of the Goodwin-Fortescue incident was “the passion
displayed by members in their resistance to the Council’s attempt to
unseat Goodwin.”105 Against a Monarch who sought to roll back the
House’s gains under the Tudors, the House pushed back, continuing to
develop a sense of itself as an essential and independent component of the
constitutional state.106
B. Contempt of Parliament and Breach of Privilege
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103. Reprinted in MATTHEW HALE, THE ORIGINAL INSTITUTION, POWER AND JURISDICTION OF
PARLIAMENTS 206, 216 (London, Tonson 1707).
104. Id.
105. Hirst, supra note 96, at 853. Hirst then proceeds to insist that this passionate pushback was
merely “political,” as distinguished from “the elaboration of clear constitutional conventions.” Id. at
855. In the context of the customary, political English constitution, this distinction is hardly clear-cut.
See CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 1 (“The British Constitution cannot be distinguished from institutional
interpretations of it: the actual, current structure of institutions is constitutive of the Constitution
itself.”). What is most important about this interaction between Crown and Parliament is that each is
asserting its own constitutional vision and seeking to create the constitutional order that it desires.
106. Cromartie has a useful discussion of Goodwin-Fortescue, but he—like James—ignores the
Tudor precedents, thereby making the House’s claims appear more novel than they really were. See
CROMARTIE, supra note 32, at 194-96.
107. 1 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 1326-27.
108. Id. at 1335.
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This clash of constitutional visions was even more apparent in an
incident that occurred toward the end of James’s reign. In 1620, James, in
need of funds, summoned a new Parliament. When it assembled in 1621, it
was more interested in discussing—and decrying—rumors of a Spanish
Match than it was in voting him supply. James immediately dashed off a
letter to the Speaker, demanding that he “acquaint that house with our
pleasure, that none therein shall presume to meddle with any thing
concerning our government or mysteries of state, namely, not to speak of
our dearest son’s match with the daughter of Spain.”107 The House replied
with a petition appealing to its “ancient and undoubted right” of “freedom
of speech, jurisdiction, and just censure of the house.”108 The King
responded in kind, asserting that
we cannot allow of the stile, calling it, your antient and undoubted
right and inheritance; but could rather have wished, that ye had
said, that your privileges were derived from the grace and
permission of our ancestors and us . . . yet we are pleased to give
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109. Id. at 1344.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1361.
112. Id. at 1362-63.
113. Id. at 1366-71.
114. See CONRAD RUSSELL, PARLIAMENTS AND ENGLISH POLITICS, 1621-1629, at 138-40 (1979)
(describing the constitutional stakes of this dispute for both James and the House).
115. See generally Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1100-12; see also Joyce Lee Malcolm, Doing No
Wrong: Law, Liberty, and the Constraint of Kings, 38 J. BRIT. STUD. 161, 176 (1999) (noting that the
language of breach of parliamentary privilege was used by the House of Commons against Charles).
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you our royal assurance, that as long as you contain yourselves
within the limits of your duty, we will be as careful to maintain and
preserve your lawful liberties and privileges, as ever any of our
predecessors were . . . .109
In case there was any doubt about what “containing [themselves] within
the limits of [their] duty” meant, he clarified that they “only have need to
beware to trench upon the prerogative of the crown.”110 In response, the
Commons entered a protestation in their Journal, reasserting that their
privileges were independent of the Crown, and, indeed, ran against the
Crown.111 James made clear what he thought of that: he sent for the
Commons’s Journal, tore out their protestation, declared it “invalid,
annulled, void, and of no effect,”112 imprisoned some of the parliamentary
ringleaders (including Coke), sent others off to Ireland as royal
commissioners, and dissolved Parliament.113
Again, we see a clash of constitutional visions: the House was
reasserting the rights that it had won under the Tudors in the face of
James’s attempts to undermine those victories.114 The House’s response
was to accuse James of breach of privilege—that is, to reassert its right to
defend its own privileges, even as against the Crown. Notice how this
power has evolved over eighty years: what began with the House
declining royal assistance in securing the release of George Ferrers
evolved into a language by which the House could actually work at crosspurposes to the Crown. In some sense, of course, James still had the upper
hand—he did, in the end, dissolve Parliament and imprison some of its
leaders. But it is clear that the House had found a language of
opposition—a language that derived directly from the privileges it had
won during the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth.
And, of course, these battles only intensified during the reign of James’s
son. From the beginning of his reign, Charles made it clear that he saw
Parliament as his tool at best, and an inconvenience at worst.
Parliamentary reactions were increasingly framed by the language of
privilege: the House asserted that it had rights, and it regarded the
Monarch’s infringement of those rights as a breach of privilege or a
contempt of Parliament.115 Consider the proceedings against the Duke of
Buckingham, Charles’s royal favorite, in the second Parliament of his
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116. For more on Buckingham’s role in Charles’s government and on the special ire directed
toward the Duke, see Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 MINN. L. REV. 347, 369-76
(2010).
117. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 49-50.
118. Id. at 56.
119. Id. at 57.
120. Id. at 69.
121. Id. at 58.
122. Id. at 79; see also 3 H.L. JOUR. (1626) 619-26 (reprinting the articles of impeachment).
123. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 193-200.
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reign.116 The House (and, indeed, much of the nation) held Buckingham
responsible for any number of state miscues, from military defeats in
Spain and France to the disastrous state of royal finances. When Charles’s
second Parliament refused to grant him supply until he had addressed its
grievances, including the growing power of Buckingham, the King angrily
replied, “I must let you know, that I will not allow any of my servants to
be questioned amongst you, much less such as are of eminent place, and
near unto me.”117 The House continued its investigation into Buckingham
and adopted a report proposing to grant supply to the Crown as soon as
“they had presented their grievances, and received his answer to them.”118
In response, Charles sent his Lord Keeper to insist that he would
by no means suffer [royal prerogative] to be violated by any
pretended colour of parliamentary liberty; wherein his maj. doth
not forget that the parliament is his council, and therefore ought to
have the liberty of a council; but his maj. understands the
difference betwixt council and controlling, and between liberty and
the abuse of liberty.119
Note carefully the language here: Parliament is Charles’s council. It ought
to have “the liberty of a council.” A wise principal gives his subordinates
certain liberties so that they may better serve him. But there is a
“difference betwixt council and controlling”—Parliament, like other
subordinates, must use its liberties in the service of its principal, not in an
attempt to assert power over its principal.
Such a claim might once have cowed the Commons, but the post-Tudor
House had a much-expanded sense of its own institutional identity. It
responded by asserting its “undoubted right and usage . . . to question and
complain of all persons, of what degree soever, found grievous to the
common-wealth.”120 It then, in direct contravention of Charles’s
commandment to “cease this unparliamentary inquisition,”121 set aside all
other business to focus on preparing articles of impeachment against the
Duke of Buckingham.122 Charles, enraged, dissolved the Parliament,
without having received the funds he sought.123
This, of course, was a vicious cycle. One of Parliament’s chief
grievances against Charles was his reliance on unconstitutional
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124. See generally Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1100-16; Chafetz, supra note 116, at 369-83.
125. For an excellent discussion of the failure of royal finances and its role in bringing about the
Civil War, see RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 161-84. To my mind, however, Russell improperly
minimizes the extent to which Charles’s debts were a consequence of his own decisions to undertake
ill-advised military campaigns at the beginning of his reign.
126. See Chafetz, supra note 116, at 374-76; Thomas Cogswell, John Felton, Popular Political
Culture, and the Assassination of the Duke of Buckingham, 49 HIST. J. 357 (2006).
127. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 437.
128. Id. at 443.
129. See Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1109 (quoting Sir Robert Philips and John Selden).
130. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 490. For the rather dramatic story of the passage of this
remonstrance and the subsequent resolutions, see CHAFETZ, supra note 43, at 73-74; Chafetz, supra
note 71, at 1110-11.
131. 2 COBBETT, supra note 99, at 491.
132. Id. at 492.
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prerogative taxation—that is, taxation not authorized by Parliament.124
When Charles refused to redress—or, indeed, even listen to—
parliamentary grievances, the House refused to vote him supply. Given the
ruinously expensive course that Charles and Buckingham were charting in
foreign affairs, the King’s only option was to rely yet more on prerogative
taxation, thus increasing the intensity of parliamentary grievance.125
In the midst of Charles’s third Parliament, in 1629—mere months after
Buckingham had been assassinated by a disgruntled army veteran126—the
complaints over unconstitutional taxation came to a head. John Rolle, a
merchant and member of the House, had refused to pay the customs duties
of tonnage and poundage levied on his goods, on the grounds that they
were illegal, as Parliament had not authorized them.127 Charles suggested
that Rolle’s problems might disappear if the House simply authorized him
to collect the duties; the House declined this invitation.128 In the course of
debating the issue, members of the House explicitly used the language of
contempt and breach of privilege to refer to royal actions.129 Charles
promptly ordered the Speaker to adjourn the House; to prevent this,
several of the opposition leaders physically held the Speaker in his chair
while another presented a remonstrance asserting that the collection of
tonnage and poundage without parliamentary consent was “a breach of the
fundamental liberties of this kingdom.”130 The House passed this
remonstrance, and followed it with a resolution declaring that “Whosoever
shall counsel, or advise, the taking and levying of the subsidies of
Tunnage and Poundage, not being granted by Parliament; or shall be an
actor or instrument therein, shall . . . be reputed an innovator in the
government, and a capital enemy to this kingdom and commonwealth.”131
Charles dissolved Parliament the next day;132 obviously fed up with the
institution, he proceeded to govern without it for the next eleven years.
What’s more, he had the parliamentary ringleaders arrested and tried
before the King’s Bench on charges of sedition and assault (for holding
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the Speaker in his chair).133 In their defense, the members argued that
Parliament had exclusive jurisdiction over matters occurring on the floor
of the House,134 essentially insisting that the Crown had breached
parliamentary privilege in haling them before the court. The judges did not
buy the jurisdictional defense, and the members were convicted and
imprisoned.135
When, as a result of the Bishops’ Wars in Scotland, Charles’s need for
funds became truly desperate in 1640, he called a new Parliament. But the
Commons of England in Parliament Assembled had a long institutional
memory. The House would do nothing about funds until Charles
addressed their grievances—both the ones they already had in 1629 and
the ones they had accumulated in the intervening years.136 The House was
especially enraged about Charles’s order to the Speaker to adjourn the
House and the prosecution and conviction of its members for resisting that
order, which it asserted over and over was a “Breach of Privilege of this
House.”137 Charles dissolved this Parliament a mere three weeks after it
assembled; it is known to history as the “Short Parliament.” But he could
not so easily dissolve his debts; within months, he was forced to call
another Parliament. The “Long Parliament,” Charles’s last, was every bit
as intent on vindicating its privileges as its predecessor had been,138 and it,
too, was especially upset about the punishment of members in the courts
of law for actions taken in the House.139 This Parliament would grow
increasingly confrontational over the next year.140
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See R. v. Elliot, Hollis & Valentine, 3 How. St. Tr. 294 (K.B. 1629).
Id. at 295-300.
Id. at 310.
See generally THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, TASWELL-LANGMEAD’S ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 390-91 (11th ed.
1960) (enumerating the grievances that the House wanted addressed); DAVID LINDSAY KEIR, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at 210 (9th ed. 1966) (same).
137. 2 H.C. JOUR. (1640) 7; id. at 12.
138. See Chafetz, supra note 71, at 1112-13.
139. See 2 H.C. JOUR. (1641) 200-01; id. at 203.
140. See generally PLUCKNETT, supra note 136, at 393-406. It is worth noting that, by 1642, the
confrontational attitude was no longer limited to the House of Commons. On January 12 of that year—
the same day that the Commons resolved that anyone who arrested a member by authority of a royal
warrant alone was guilty of a breach of the privileges of Parliament, see supra text accompanying note
12—the Lords held the Lieutenant of the Tower in contempt for obeying the King’s order to remain at
his post rather than the Lords’ order to attend upon the House. 4 H.L. JOUR. (1642) 508. Russell refers
to this incident as an example of Charles’s “diminished majesty.” RUSSELL, supra note 40, at 23.
Likewise, in April of that year, when Charles dismissed the Lord Chamberlain (Essex) and the Groom
of the Stool (Holland) for refusing to attend upon him at York, the Lords and Commons both resolved
that Charles’s summoning of them away from Parliament and his dismissal of them when they refused
to come were both breaches of parliamentary privilege. Moreover, they resolved that anyone who
accepted the vacant offices “until Satisfaction be given to both Houses of Parliament” would breach
privilege. 4 H.L. JOUR. (1642) 719.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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141. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12.
142. In this regard, I very much agree with Lawrence Stone’s conclusion that a number of
revisionist historians of the Civil War have “seriously under-estimated the degree of continuity in the
constitutional struggle from crisis to crisis, as proven by the constant harping back to previous
episodes.” STONE, supra note 42, at 167. Victories, cast as precedents, are analytically, emotively, and
rhetorically powerful.
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And this brings us full circle—back to the Grand Remonstrance, back to
the accusation of treason, back to Charles barging into the House, and
back to Charles being driven from London.141 Perhaps now we are a bit
better positioned to understand how these events came to be—that is, to
understand what allowed the House of Commons to take the lead in
initiating the Civil War. Parliament in the second half of the Tudor
dynasty made great strides. They have not always been recognized as such
by historians, for they dealt not with foreign affairs, religion, succession,
or even taxation, but rather with the more prosaic and procedural matters
of the House’s own privileges—its authority over its own composition, its
ability to use the contempt power, its freedom of speech. These had
theretofore been dealt with by Crown officers, a natural consequence of
Parliament’s subordination to the Crown. As long as Parliament’s
institutional authority was wholly subordinated to royal authority, then of
course who sat in Parliament would be a matter for royal judgment. And
of course contempts against the House would be understood and punished
as interferences with the normal functioning of royal governance.
But in the late Tudor moment, from the 1540s through the end of
Elizabeth’s reign, a significant shift occurred. The House itself took over
these functions, and it did so consciously. Assuming these functions
necessitated clashing with the Crown. That they were willing to provoke
the Crown in this way indicates the importance the Commons assigned to
control of these functions. Moreover, the very act of confronting the
Crown required the House to begin articulating reasons for its positions.
What emerged in this period was a House of Commons that was
developing and articulating a sense of itself as a power in its own right, a
power that need not—and, indeed, refused to—rely on any other. It was
the development of this constitutional self-image, and its supporting
arguments, in the late Tudor period that allowed the House to push back
against Stuart attempts at retrenchment.142 Try as James might to dismiss
precedents from “the Time of a Woman,” he could not will the House’s
newfound self-conception into oblivion.
When the House of Commons refused to accept royal assistance in
securing George Ferrers’s release, it insisted that it must be the one to
vindicate its own rights. Contempt of Parliament is an offense against
Parliament, and Parliament alone has jurisdiction to remedy it. The issue,
when it was merely about George Ferrers, a private creditor, and a few
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London jailers, seems like a low-stakes controversy. But the Commons’s
victory—its winning of exclusive jurisdiction over contempt—opened up
new vistas.143 Soon it became possible to think of holding royal officials
themselves in contempt. Indeed, it became possible to conceive of a
contempt committed by the King himself, a fact that Charles I discovered
shortly after he barged into the House of Commons on January 4, 1642.
This parliamentary mobilization against the King would have significant
consequences, both in England and beyond. In England, even after the
royal Restoration, Parliament would be unwilling to return to its older
role. When Charles’s son, James II, pushed too far in that direction, he too
was deprived of his throne. And in America, the historic struggles between
Crown and Parliament played a major role in the thinking of the rebellious
colonists. As Jack Greene has noted, oppositional behavior of colonial
legislatures was “deeply rooted” in the tradition of parliamentary
opposition to the Stuart monarchs,144 opposition that was enabled by the
procedural developments discussed in this Article. This opposition was
also foremost in the minds of the newly independent Americans as they
drafted and ratified their national Constitution,145 with its checks on
executive behavior and explicit protections for legislative privileges.
Parliamentary victories won “in the Time of a Woman” thus continue to
have important ramifications today.
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143. Thus the “new modes of parliamentary action” that Cromartie identifies in the Stuart House
of Commons are, in fact, deeply rooted in the Tudor House of Commons. See CROMARTIE, supra note
32, at 190-94.
144. JACK P. GREENE, NEGOTIATED AUTHORITIES: ESSAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 189-90 (1994).
145. See, e.g., Chafetz, supra note 116, at 367-88 (noting the importance of the example of
Charles I in the debates over making the American president subject to impeachment).

